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An animal’s behavior is affected by its cognitive abilities, which are, in turn, a 21 
consequence of the environment in which an animal has evolved and developed. 22 
Although behavioral ecologists have been studying animals in their natural environment 23 
for several decades, over much the same period animal cognition has been studied 24 
almost exclusively in the laboratory. Traditionally, the study of animal cognition has 25 
been based on well-established paradigms used to investigate well-defined cognitive 26 
processes. This allows identification of what animals can do, but may not, however, 27 
always reflect what animals actually do in the wild. As both ecologists and some 28 
psychologists increasingly try to explain behaviors observable only in wild animals, we 29 
review the different motivations and methodologies used to study cognition in the wild 30 
and identify some of the challenges that accompany the combination of a naturalistic 31 
approach together with typical psychological testing paradigms. We think that studying 32 
animal cognition in the wild is likely to be most productive when the questions 33 
addressed correspond to the species’ ecology and when laboratory cognitive tests are 34 
appropriately adapted for use in the field. Furthermore, recent methodological and 35 
technological advances will likely allow significant expansion of the species and 36 




  41 
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The natural habitat of an animal contains many potential sources of useful 42 
information. For a male rufous hummingbird Selaphorus rufus spending his breeding 43 
season in the Canadian Rocky Mountains, for example, each flower in his territory has a 44 
particular appearance, occupies a unique spatial location, contains a certain volume and 45 
concentration of nectar, and having been emptied, takes a specific length of time to 46 
refill. Considering the high metabolism of hummingbirds, as well as the pressing 47 
concerns of attracting a mate and defending his territory from rivals, we might expect 48 
that the hummingbird would take advantage of this environmental information in order 49 
to forage efficiently. The issue is how one might test the types of information 50 
hummingbirds acquire, and how they use them, during foraging. 51 
Historically, addressing questions about the kinds of information animals in the 52 
wild can acquire and how they might use them has typically involved bringing the 53 
species of interest out of the wild and into the traditional home of experimental 54 
psychology, the laboratory (Balda & Kamil, 2006; Brodbeck, 1994; Chappell & 55 
Kacelnik, 2004; Pravosudov & Roth II, 2013). The study of cognition in the wild was, 56 
then, predominantly restricted to observational studies where cognitive abilities were 57 
attributed to an animal based on interpretations of that animal’s behavior (Allen & 58 
Bekoff, 1999; Byrne & Bates, 2011; Byrne & Whiten, 1989). 59 
Recently, however, questions as to the evolution and ecological role of cognition 60 
have come to the forefront of behavioral ecology, as behavioral ecologists seek to 61 
understand the evolution of the mechanisms underpinning behavior, in particular the 62 
evolution of cognitive abilities (e.g. Morand-Ferron, Cole, & Quinn, 2015; Rowe & 63 
Healy, 2014; Smith, Phillips & Reichard, 2015; Thornton & Lukas, 2012). However, 64 
rather than taking ecologically interesting animals into the laboratory, there is an 65 
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increasing focus on taking the experimental study of animal cognition out into the field 66 
to test cognition in its natural habitat. 67 
The prospects for experimentally studying animal cognition in the field look 68 
better than ever before. Over 30 years of research in behavioral ecology has led to a vast 69 
literature on the flexibility of the behavior of animals in the wild, as well as the roles 70 
that using information could play in adaptive behavior. Additionally, after 4 decades, 71 
comparative cognition research in the laboratory has given us a firm grounding in the 72 
cognitive mechanisms that can underlie animal behavior. This strong grounding in these 73 
two research traditions provides an ideal foundation for researchers to investigate the 74 
role of cognition in the lives of wild animals.  75 
Researchers from a range of fields are motivated to study cognition in the wild 76 
for a number of reasons; so, here, we discuss why researchers already working on 77 
cognition in the wild may choose to work outside of the laboratory and how to test 78 
hypotheses in the wild experimentally. Much of our discussion is directed to our own 79 
interests in the spatial and temporal cognition of wild hummingbirds, and lessons we 80 
have learned; however, a great deal of what we cover will be relevant to researchers 81 
addressing a broad range of species and other cognitive abilities.  82 
Working in an animal’s natural environment forces researchers to deal with 83 
ecological and logistic challenges rarely faced by researchers in the laboratory.  84 
Through the choice of a useful study species, ecologically-inspired experiments plus 85 
new technological advances, however, it is increasingly possible to probe the cognition 86 
of an ever-expanding range of wild animals.  87 
 88 
Why study cognition in the wild? 89 
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This question is as broad as the question of why one should study animal 90 
cognition at all. The benefits and challenges of working in the field, however, lend 91 
themselves to asking certain questions rather more readily than others. In this section, 92 
we describe some of the various reasons why scientists choose to work in the field, both 93 
in terms of the aims of their research programmes, but also in terms of the practical 94 
benefits of working outside of the laboratory. 95 
 96 
The Ecological Approach 97 
Research programmes within the Ecological Approach involve the testing of 98 
hypotheses that concern how natural selection might have shaped animal cognition. 99 
 100 
Cognitive Ecology 101 
During the 1980s and 1990s, the intersection of behavioral ecology and 102 
experimental psychology led to the new field of cognitive ecology (Dukas 1998; Dukas 103 
& Ratcliffe, 2009; Healy & Braithwaite 2000; see also the synthetic approach/cognitive 104 
ethology as used by Kamil 1998) as researchers began to base their hypotheses on the 105 
natural history of different species to test predictions about the cognitive abilities of 106 
those animals. This approach is perhaps best encapsulated by the work on spatial 107 
memory in food-storing and non-food-storing birds, where knowledge about the natural 108 
history of different species led to a priori predictions about how the ability of those 109 
birds to remember locations should vary, predictions that were largely supported (e.g., 110 
Biegler, McGregor, Krebs, & Healy, 2001; Hampton, Shettleworth, & Westwood, 1998; 111 
McGregor & Healy, 1999). 112 
Although that work was located in the laboratory, ecologically-based questions 113 
have also been addressed in the field. For example, a long-running study of 114 
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hummingbird cognition in the wild has tested a range of a priori predictions about the 115 
information to which hummingbirds “should” pay attention to in order to forage 116 
effectively (Healy & Hurly 2013). Using field experiments that create a simplified 117 
version of their natural environment, it is possible to investigate whether hummingbirds 118 
can pay attention to various types of information present in the environment, as well as 119 
the kinds of information they preferentially use during foraging. One of the challenges 120 
of the cognitive ecology research programme, however, is to objectively identify a 121 
priori predictions about types of information to which animals “should” pay attention. 122 
With some knowledge of an animal’s natural history, it may seem straightforward to 123 
generate predictions as to why animals should value certain cues over others. For 124 
example, because the color and morphology of hummingbird-pollinated flowers have 125 
evolved in response to hummingbird foraging (Temeles, Pan, Brennan & Horwitt, 126 
2000), one might expect that hummingbirds pay considerable attention to flower color 127 
when they first approach a flower (e.g. Grant, 1966). And, yet, in field experiments 128 
where hummingbirds are trained to visit a flower of a particular color in a particular 129 
location, when spatial and color cues are dissociated, hummingbirds consistently choose 130 
flowers in the “correct” spatial location over flowers of the “correct” color (Hurly & 131 
Healy, 2002; Hurly & Healy, 1996; Tello-Ramos, Hurly, & Healy, 2014). 132 
Similarly, captive and wild nectivorous bats trained to feed from 133 
echoacoustically distinctive flowers also preferred to use spatial cues rather than the 134 
flowers’ unique acoustic shape when returning to feed at a rewarded flower (Thiele & 135 
Winter, 2005). As many flowers may look similar but each sits in a unique location, a 136 
possible post-hoc explanation for the preference of spatial rather than feature cues (e.g. 137 
color, shape) is not difficult. The previous examples however, serve to illustrate that 138 
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formulating a priori predictions about information use based on ecology and natural 139 
history can be less than straightforward.  140 
 141 
Behavioral Ecology 142 
An alternative ecological approach to studying the evolution of cognition 143 
involves attempts to assess the value of a cognitive ability in terms of its impact on 144 
survival and reproductive success, with the prediction that “better” cognition should 145 
lead to increased fitness. This link between fitness and cognition had previously been 146 
largely assumed, as researchers sought to understand the cognitive mechanisms 147 
underlying behaviors that contributed to fitness, such as foraging (e.g., Bateson, 2002; 148 
Brunner, Kacelnik, & Gibbon 1992), mate choice (e.g., Bateson, 1978; ten Cate, 149 
Verzjiden, & Etman, 2006), and communication (e.g., Marler, 1997; ten Cate & Rowe, 150 
2007). 151 
Recently, however, interest has begun to include the direct investigation of the 152 
fitness consequences of cognition, inspired by the success of the work on the evolution 153 
of learning in Drosophila, in which flies respond to artificial selection on their 154 
associative learning abilities (e.g., Mery & Kawecki, 2003, 2005). Unlike the cognitive 155 
ecology focus on the ability of animals to learn particular ecologically relevant 156 
information, this more recent interest has tended to be directed towards “general” 157 
cognitive ability, typically assessed using one or more “problem-solving” tasks. 158 
One commonly-used example is the “lid-flipping” task often presented to birds 159 
as a novel or innovative foraging task (e.g., Boogert, Giraldeau, & Lefebvre, 2008; 160 
Bateson & Matheson 2007; Liker & Bokony 2009). In this task, the bird must learn to 161 
remove a cover from a well containing food, where learning ability or innovativeness is 162 
typically assessed by the number of trials that a bird takes to learn to remove the lids 163 
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(see Griffin & Guez, 2014 for a recent review). Variation in an animal’s performance 164 
across one or more of these generic tasks is used as a proxy for variation in this 165 
cognitive trait, allowing for the identification of correlations between “cognitive ability” 166 
and various aspects of life history (Morand-Ferron, Cole, & Quinn, 2015; Quinn, Cole, 167 
& Morand-Ferron, 2014; Thornton, Isden, & Madden, 2014). 168 
Although some of these research programmes have involved tests of the 169 
cognitive abilities of wild animals brought into the laboratory (e.g. Cole et al. 2012), 170 
problem-solving tests are increasingly being presented to animals in the wild (Isden, 171 
Panayi, Dingle, & Madden, 2013; Keagy, Savard, & Borgia, 2009; Morand-Ferron & 172 
Quinn, 2011; Morand-Ferron, Cole, Rawles, & Quinn, 2011). For example, male 173 
bowerbirds can be induced to solve batteries of problem-solving tasks, and their 174 
performance can be compared to their mating success (Isden et al., 2013; Keagy et al., 175 
2009).  176 
 177 
The Anthropocentric Approach 178 
A large body of research addressed at investigating such aspects of cognition as 179 
social cognition, numerosity, and causal understanding in wild animals is based less on 180 
the ecology of a particular species and rather more on a search for human-like cognitive 181 
processes in non-human animals (e.g. Taylor, Hunt, Medina, & Gray, 2009; Mayer et al. 182 
2014; Smet & Byrne, 2013). This research is usually characterized by an interest in 183 
“complex” cognition, generally defined with relation to human cognitive abilities, and 184 
the degree to which such abilities are present in other species. Much of this work is 185 
aimed at the identification of possible selection pressures that led to the evolution of 186 
human intelligence (Maclean et al. 2012) through the description of the cognitive 187 
abilities of species that are closely related to humans, or that share some biological or 188 
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ecological characteristic with humans, such as a relatively large brain or a fission-fusion 189 
social structure.  190 
 191 
Practical benefits to working in the wild 192 
To date, of course, most studies of animal cognition have been conducted in the 193 
laboratory, and for good reason. The malleable environment of the laboratory allows the 194 
precise control over information available to animals during training and testing, while 195 
control over the husbandry of laboratory animals, including training regimes and diet, 196 
allows some degree of control over the motivation and previous experience of 197 
experimental subjects. As nearly all of this control is difficult if not impossible to 198 
achieve in the experimental study of animal cognition in the wild, this can be a major 199 
downside to attempting to investigate animal cognition in the wild.  That said, there are 200 
ways in which this apparent cost to working with wild animals in their natural habitat 201 
may be mitigated. 202 
 203 
Access to “natural” subjects and behaviors 204 
Perhaps the first of these, and one that motivates many keen to investigate the 205 
evolution of cognition, is that by working with animals in the wild, one can potentially 206 
access a much wider range of study species than just those suited to the laboratory. 207 
Additionally, this might mean gaining access to investigating the mechanisms that 208 
underlie “natural” behaviors, which are not easily produced or tested in the laboratory.  209 
In some cases, the behavior of interest is carried out on a scale that excludes it 210 
from being studied in any real way in the confines of the laboratory environment. For 211 
example, determining whether avian migrants truly know the location of their wintering 212 
grounds, rather than just the distance and direction to fly in order to reach them, relies 213 
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on experiments carried out on a grand scale impossible in the laboratory (Perdeck, 214 
1958; Thorup et al., 2006). 215 
Similarly, the homing flights of pigeons are impressive because of the distances 216 
involved. Pigeons released in unfamiliar territory, many kilometres from their home 217 
loft, can reliably find their way home using multiple sources of information from their 218 
surroundings to fix their position and chart a homeward trajectory (Wallraff, 2005). 219 
Although the small-scale spatial cognition of pigeons can be investigated successfully in 220 
the laboratory (Cheng, Spetch, Kelly, & Bingman, 2006), such data do not confirm how 221 
it is that pigeons manage to home successfully over longer distances. Only by studying 222 
the behavior of pigeons navigating home from unfamiliar locations have researchers 223 
made significant headway in understanding what environmental information the pigeons 224 
use. 225 
Discoveries such as the role of the sun compass, the use of magnetic and 226 
olfactory information (Wallraff, 2004; Wiltschko & Wiltschko, 2009), and the possible 227 
use of different mechanisms inside and outside the familiar area (Guilford & Biro, 228 
2014), have all relied on pigeons having access to real-world environments, and may 229 
never have been discovered if the study of pigeon navigation had been restricted to the 230 
scale of a laboratory testing room. Not only is the experimental study of homing 231 
pigeons travelling through their natural environment a successful example of studying 232 
animal cognition in the wild, it is a system that has also allowed a rare opportunity to 233 
investigate the neurobiology of navigation over larger scales by studying the effects of 234 
hippocampal lesions, often studied in small laboratory environments, on the large scale 235 
navigation of homing pigeons (e.g., Bingman et al., 2005). 236 
One key feature of the laboratory species commonly used to investigate animal 237 
cognition, such as pigeons, rats, and zebra finches, is their ability to thrive in captivity. 238 
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Pigeons and rats in the laboratory can also readily be trained to search for food or to 239 
modify their behavior to gain reward, e.g., through pressing levers (e.g., Adams & 240 
Dickinson, 1980) or pecking at lights (Brown & Jenkins, 1968), while zebra finches 241 
readily sing, choose mates, and build nests, allowing access to the cognitive abilities 242 
that underlie these behaviors (e.g., Bailey et al. 2014; Muth & Healy, 2014 ). 243 
Should one want to investigate the cognitive abilities of a non-typical species, 244 
then one has first to consider the logistical implications of appropriate housing and 245 
welfare, before considering whether that species can then either perform the relevant 246 
behavior or be capable of being trained to do so. Food-storing birds, especially the tits 247 
and chickadees, have proved to be a very successful example of wild animals that do 248 
well (although they do not reproduce) once in the laboratory. They also both store food 249 
readily and can be trained to perform a variety of rewarded tasks (e.g., Healy 1995; 250 
McGregor & Healy 1999; Pravosudov & Roth II 2013). For many species, the housing 251 
issue alone is sufficient to exclude laboratory testing, whereas for others the question 252 
itself is more appropriately addressed in the field.  253 
  254 
Access to “natural” environments 255 
The information available to an animal in the wild is very different from the 256 
information available to an animal in the laboratory. In some respects, this may seem to 257 
be obvious. What may be less obvious is that the difference in information between the 258 
laboratory and the wild can be qualitative as well as quantitative. 259 
Typically, differences between the laboratory and the wild are discussed in 260 
quantitative terms: the laboratory is barren or sparse, whereas the field has more 261 
confounded variables. The implication is that there is more information available to the 262 
animal in the wild, more potentially confounded cues, which make understanding how 263 
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animals use a particular source of information more challenging. Even critiques of the 264 
laboratory environment rely on this logic, arguing that the lack of information makes 265 
the laboratory somehow unnatural, which then limits its value for testing ecologically 266 
relevant cognition (e.g., Jacobs & Menzel 2014). 267 
What may be less often appreciated, however, is that the environment of the 268 
laboratory can structure the kinds of information that animals acquire. Take, for 269 
example, the use of local and global cues in a spatial cognition task. An animal trained 270 
in the laboratory to search for a hidden piece of food near a landmark (a local cue) 271 
learns that information in a very specific wider environment. Often animals are tested in 272 
a relatively small test room or maze, rarely more than a few metres across, and almost 273 
always delimited by walls or other distinct boundaries that can provide “global” 274 
information. This global information can affect how the animal uses the landmark to 275 
remember the food’s location. For example, as a single landmark by itself can provide 276 
distance and not direction information, global cues, such as the size and shape of the 277 
room, can be used to provide the direction information necessary for the landmark to 278 
reliably indicate the location of the reward. 279 
If an animal’s ability to use a landmark depends on the available global 280 
information, and global information differs between different environments, then the 281 
environment in which an animal is trained could shape how that animal uses a 282 
landmark. Obviously the lab and the field are very different environments, but even 283 
within the laboratory, differences in rooms or mazes could result in animals acquiring 284 
different information. The available global information could depend, for example, on 285 
the size of the testing area: both redtail splitfin fish Xenotoca eiseni and chicks will use 286 
the geometry of an enclosure to orient themselves, but both species appear to weight 287 
this geometric information more heavily in smaller enclosures than in larger enclosures 288 
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(Chiandetti et al., 2007; Sovrano et al., 2005, 2007). If landmark use does depend on 289 
global cues as well as local cues, then this effect of enclosure size could result in 290 
animals in larger enclosures using different information when they search for a reward 291 
relative to a landmark than does an animal that searches for reward in smaller 292 
enclosures. 293 
The influence of the properties of the test environment on shaping how animals 294 
use landmarks has implications for what studies in the laboratory tell us about animals 295 
in the outside world.  For example, if landmark-use experiments were to be conducted 296 
in the wild, the global information available to the wild animal, and as a result the 297 
information it learns about the rewarded location, could be very different from that 298 
learned by an animal trained to do a similar task in the laboratory. The “wild” is large, 299 
open and predominantly wall free. And, although insurmountable boundaries such as 300 
cliffs and rivers may be present, free-living, wild animals are very rarely enclosed in a 301 
small space by such boundaries. As a result, as an animal in the wild moves through its 302 
environment, its perception of its surroundings is likely to be very different from that of 303 
an animal moving around in a small walled room. 304 
For laboratory-tested animal, features such as boundaries and the shape of the 305 
environment are likely to be more salient. And, when landmarks are moved between 306 
trials, the apparent changes in the global information in the laboratory may appear more 307 
severe than if landmarks were to be moved an equivalent distance in the wild (Pritchard, 308 
Hurly, & Healy, 2015). Rather than acting as a neutral background against which 309 
stimuli can be precisely controlled, the environment of the laboratory can, thus, play an 310 
active role in the kinds of information that animals learn. This might suggest that 311 
researchers testing animals solely in the laboratory would also have an interest in the 312 
outcome of analogous experiments conducted on free-living animals. 313 
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 The difference between the laboratory environment and the natural conditions 314 
under which an animal usually learns about its environment is not just physical. Social 315 
factors can affect what animals in the wild can learn or how they express their learning 316 
in behavior. Solitary individuals may be able to readily solve a task or attend to a source 317 
of information in the laboratory, but in the wild, an animal’s performance may be 318 
affected by a number of social factors. Individuals may be distracted by the needs to 319 
defend territory, defend mates from competitors, or fend off undesired suitors. 320 
Dominant individuals may monopolize access to foraging or mating opportunities, 321 
preventing lower ranked individuals from acquiring novel information or using the 322 
information that they have acquired (Gajdon, Fijn, & Huber, 2004; Morand-Ferron et 323 
al., 2011). What animals can do in the laboratory may be quite different from what they 324 
are able to do in the wild.  325 
 326 
Stress and motivation 327 
Even if the species of interest could be brought into the laboratory and the scale 328 
of the laboratory and the information available to the animals were appropriate for 329 
understanding the behavior of interest, the animal itself may still experience the 330 
laboratory task very differently than if it were presented with an analogous task in the 331 
wild. This is because confining or handling some animals, or presenting them with 332 
unfamiliar tasks, can result in those animals becoming stressed (Balcombe, Barnard, & 333 
Sandusky, 2004). Such stress may affect the animal’s motivation and/or behavior 334 
(Baenninger, 1967), preventing it from either learning a task appropriately or not at all 335 
(Bowman, 2005). This can then lead to the conclusion that the animal cannot learn 336 
information that it actually did learn or to the interpretation that the behavioral response 337 
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is a result of impaired cognition, rather than that the impairment is due to a stress 338 
response. 339 
For example, male rats Rattus norvegicus outperform female rats in spatial tests 340 
when tested in the Morris water maze. The acute stress of performing the task, however, 341 
can result in females being much more thigmotactic (swimming close to the maze wall) 342 
than males (Harris, D’Eath, & Healy, 2008). Although this can look like a sex 343 
difference in spatial cognition (the time taken to find the hidden platform), once the 344 
time spent in thigmotaxis is removed, males and females take just as long to swim to the 345 
platform, thus demonstrating they have learned its location equally well.  346 
Of course, animals in the wild are by no means free of stress. Indeed, avoiding 347 
predators and having to find sufficient food to avoid starvation are significant stressors. 348 
However, as animals tested in the wild are not confined during training or testing and 349 
can disengage with the experiment when they choose, if they do engage, then the 350 
experimenter can assume they are motivated to do so. Their performance even under 351 
conditions of daily life stressors may better reflect their true capacities under natural 352 
conditions than those of animals tested in the laboratory, while also avoiding the 353 
development of behavioral artefacts such as a stereotypical flight patterns or obsessive 354 
biting or licking (Mason, 1991). 355 
Laboratory conditions, on the other hand, might lead to confined animals being 356 
more motivated or habituated to solve cognitive tasks than wild animals. For example, 357 
captive kea Nestor notabilis learned how to lift a tube more readily that did kea in the 358 
wild (Gajdon, Fijn & Huber, 2004). Wild spotted hyenas Crocuta crocuta, too, were 359 
less successful at approaching and solving a novel task than were captive hyenas 360 
(Benson-Amram, Weldele, & Holekamp, 2013). The possible difficulties in directly 361 
comparing data collected in the laboratory with data collected in the wild were seen 362 
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when the performance of the same great tits tested in similar tasks in the laboratory and 363 
then in the wild were not correlated (Morand-Ferron et al., 2011).  364 
 365 
Testing cognition in the wild 366 
Testing animal cognition outside the laboratory affects the kinds of questions 367 
that researchers can ask and how they are able to ask them. There are two major types of 368 
questions typically addressed concerning animal cognition in the wild: those that 369 
concern what an animal can learn and those that concern what an animal has learned. 370 
 371 
What can animals in the wild learn?  372 
Questions that address what an animal can learn usually involve measuring the 373 
performance of an animal on an experimental task in which the use of a particular 374 
cognitive ability is deemed necessary for success; if an animal performs the task, then 375 
the animal is considered to possess that cognitive ability. Such an approach is often 376 
employed in problem-solving tasks, in which animals learn to acquire a reward through 377 
performing a novel action or series of actions. These “problems” can be easily modified 378 
in form to suit the manipulative skills of the species of interest (e.g., lids that can be 379 
prised off using a bill, a nose, teeth, and so on) and the use of this kind of task has lead 380 
to demonstrations of problem-solving abilities from a wide range of species (Griffin & 381 
Guez, 2014). 382 
However, as problem solving tasks are usually concerned with motor learning, 383 
the nature of any information that the animals have acquired about the task is rarely 384 
investigated. Instead, researchers more often focus on the role that manipulative skill, 385 
persistence, and inhibition play in success (e.g., Benson-Amram & Holekamp, 2012; 386 
Griffin & Guez, 2014; Griffin, Diquelou, & Perea, 2014), investigating why individuals 387 
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vary in their ability to solve a task rather than analysing the information that the animals 388 
have acquired about the task itself (Thornton & Lucas, 2012). 389 
The cognitive ecological approach, in which researchers test a priori predictions 390 
about cognitive ability based on species’ ecologies, has also been used to determine 391 
what animals can learn. For example, arrays of artificial flowers presented in birds’ 392 
territories with specific delays before each flower is refilled have been used to show that 393 
rufous hummingbirds can learn which flowers refill after 10 and which refill after 20 394 
min: birds return to the 10-min flowers after 10-15 min and to the 20-min flowers after 395 
20-25 min (Henderson et al., 2006). Rufous hummingbirds will also learn to visit 396 
particular patches at the times of day when the artificial flowers in those patches contain 397 
reward (Figure 1; Tello-Ramos, Hurly, Higgott, & Healy, 2015). Although, as in 398 
problem-solving tasks, birds can “succeed” or “fail” depending on whether they visit the 399 
rewarded flowers or not, the pattern of the birds’ successes and failures demonstrated 400 
one of the kinds of information to which these birds can pay attention during foraging, 401 
in this case, intervals of time (also see Fetterman & Killeen, 1995 for a laboratory 402 
analogue of this time-place foraging task). 403 
 404 
What have wild animals learned?  405 
One of the challenges to asking what animals can learn is that researchers might 406 
make assumptions about the cognitive mechanisms necessary to solve a particular task 407 
(Sulikowski & Burke, 2015). Although a task might be designed to test a particular 408 
cognitive ability, such as episodic-like memory or spatial memory, the cues that animals 409 
actually use might not match those assumed by the experimenters. By themselves, tests 410 
of whether animals can solve a task actually may tell us very little about the information 411 
that the animals use to solve the task. 412 
Pritchard et al.     Cognition in the wild                                                                                               
 
18 
For example, in the Tello-Ramos et al. (2015) time-place learning experiment, 413 
hummingbirds increasingly visited the appropriate patch of flowers for each hour of the 414 
4 hours during which flower patches were available each day (Figure 1; Tello-Ramos, 415 
Hurly, Higgott & Healy, 2015). It is not clear, however, how the hummingbirds did this.  416 
For example, they might have learned the location of the rewarded patch or the 417 
appearance of the rewarded flowers. They may have used interval timing, circadian 418 
timing, or have remembered the order in which the patches refilled. To determine which 419 
of these possibilities the birds did use and, more generally, to identify what cognitive 420 
abilities an animal has used to solve a particular task, other kinds of experiments are 421 
required. 422 
One form such an experiment might take is to train an animal to reach a 423 
performance criterion and then to present the animal with an unrewarded test trial in 424 
which some component of the task has been manipulated. For example, a hummingbird 425 
that has been trained to use a pair of landmarks to locate a rewarded flower could use a 426 
number of different distance and direction cues from those landmarks to remember the 427 
flower’s position (Figure 2). By modifying the landmarks and removing the flower, 428 
these different cues can be put into conflict and the way in which the hummingbird 429 
responds when it searches for the absent flower can be used to determine the cues to 430 
which it had attended.   431 
 More naturalistic cues, such as those used in playback experiments, may require 432 
very little training of an animal, as they have been “trained” by their previous 433 
experience during their life. Apparently simple experimental designs can provide insight 434 
into what wild animals have learned of their surroundings. Playbacks were used to 435 
show, for example, that on return from migration, male hooded warblers Setophaga 436 
citrina not only recognized the songs of their neighbors, but that they also remembered 437 
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the locations of their neighbors’ territories, treating the song of a neighbor apparently 438 
sung in the “wrong” territory as they would the song of a stranger (Godard, 1991). 439 
Multiple playbacks can also be used to assess whether the information that an 440 
animal has learned is the same for different stimuli, using a habituation-dishabituation 441 
paradigm. For example, Diana monkeys Cercopithecus diana Diana, habituated to the 442 
sound of leopard-specific alarm calls through repeated playback, remained habituated 443 
when played the sound of a leopard growling, but dishabituated when played the shriek 444 
of an eagle, when the monkeys once again responded with an alarm call. A parallel 445 
result was found for monkeys that had habituated to eagle-specific alarm calls: they did 446 
not respond to the eagle shriek, but dishabituated when played the leopard growl 447 
(Zuberbühler, Cheney, & Seyfarth, 1999). This pattern of results strongly suggests that 448 
the monkeys associated both the sound of the alarm calls and the predator noises with 449 
some internal representation of each predator.  450 
 451 
The relevance of ecology 452 
Whether the question is what an animal can learn or what it is that it has learned, 453 
the ease with which these questions can be addressed in the wild may be constrained by 454 
the ecology of the species being studied. By taking ecology into account early on, 455 
however, researchers can avoid or find ways around such constraints. 456 
 457 
Species choice 458 
The ecology of a species is very likely to affect how readily the cognitive 459 
abilities used by that species can be studied in the wild, especially in experimental tests 460 
of hypotheses about animal cognition (Thornton, 2014). This is much less of an obstacle 461 
when using observational methods (Byrne & Bates, 2011). Perhaps frustrating for many 462 
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potential researchers of animal cognition in the wild is the multiplicity of reasons why a 463 
particular species might be unsuitable.  464 
Ideally, animals suitable for the experimental study of cognition in the wild 465 
should be reliable, observable, and amenable. Reliable animals are those that can be 466 
found easily on multiple occasions and will perform the behavior of interest sufficiently 467 
frequently to allow collection of adequate data. Animals that are rare or perform 468 
behaviors that occur sporadically would not be reliable and may be challenging to study 469 
in the wild. 470 
Rufous hummingbirds have been a useful example for studying cognition in the 471 
wild because they are very reliable. Throughout the breeding season, males are almost 472 
always found within their individual feeding territories, which they fiercely defend from 473 
rivals (Kodric-Brown & Brown, 1978). As they are highly motivated to find food and 474 
typically feed every 10-15 min, it is relatively simple to collect sufficient data even 475 
though their breeding season may be as short as 6 weeks. 476 
Observable animals are those that can be identified and whose behaviors can be 477 
readily recorded. Identifying and quantifying cognitive abilities depends on recording 478 
performance of the same individuals. The ease with which this is done may range from 479 
relatively straightforward irrespective of the animal (e.g., recording the sounds an 480 
animal makes for addressing questions concerning acoustic communication) or vary in 481 
complexity depending on the animal. For example, to investigate the use of landmarks 482 
in navigation, one might require sophisticated data-loggers to track the paths of animals 483 
across great distances (Guilford et al., 2011) or require little more than a pencil and a 484 
notebook (e.g., desert ants; Muller & Wehner, 1988). 485 
Finally, amenable animals are those willing to partake in the relevant field 486 
experiments. One stumbling block to working on some species may be the degree to 487 
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which the animal displays neophobia when presented with an experimental apparatus. 488 
Although neophobia may be fascinating in itself, it can make training animals to interact 489 
with apparatus a lengthy and difficult experience. Although animals may habituate to 490 
experimental equipment with time and suitably graded exposure, working with less 491 
neophobic species, such as Kea (Gajdon et al., 2004) or New Zealand robins Petroica 492 
longipes (Garland, Low, & Burns, 2012) can make running experiments in the wild a 493 
much smoother experience. 494 
Amenability can, however, go beyond just a lack of neophobia. The ability to 495 
move animals, to change their environment with artificial landmarks or sounds, or to 496 
control the sensory environment that those animals experience also depends on the 497 
relevant species. It is far easier, for example, to move a desert ant to a new location to 498 
investigate the animal’s response to dealing with self-motion and visual cues in conflict 499 
(e.g., Collett & Collett, 2009), than to conduct the same experiment with a large 500 
mammal. Logistical issues of this nature are just one of the reasons that the navigation 501 
mechanisms used by wild desert ants are well understood (Collett, Chittka, & Collett, 502 
2013), whereas the mechanisms underlying similar abilities in many larger species are 503 
not. With a considered choice of a study species—one that is reliable, observable, and 504 
amenable to experimental investigation—it is much easier to investigate cognition 505 
without having to bring animals into the laboratory. 506 
 507 
Experimental design 508 
Having chosen a suitable species, the next hurdle for investigating cognition in 509 
the wild is the form in which to present the relevant question. If one is interested in 510 
whether an animal can use certain types of information, for example, then even in the 511 
laboratory there are already a variety of testing paradigms. For instance, to determine 512 
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which cues an animal uses to return to a location, there is often a convergence on 513 
standardized paradigms, such as the radial maze or the Morris Water Maze, although 514 
these devices can come in different forms (e.g., Bond, Cook & Lamb, 1981; Flores-515 
Abreu et al., 2014; Hilton & Krebs, 1990; Spetch & Edwards, 1986). In the wild, in 516 
order to ensure an animal’s participation, these paradigms, at least in their laboratory 517 
form, may well be unsuitable, forcing field experimenters to “think outside of the box.” 518 
As the variety in the laboratory suggests, conformity to established paradigms need not 519 
be strictly enforced, and novel experimental designs can be used to address familiar 520 
questions.  521 
One way to encourage the participation of wild animals in experiments is to 522 
attempt to tie the experiment into the day-to-day life of the animal. This might be done 523 
by using a paradigm that utilizes a familiar context, such as a naturalistic foraging task 524 
(Healy & Hurly, 1995), sexual display, or predator avoidance. Taking advantage of 525 
these natural behaviors can result in increasing the motivation of animals to take part or 526 
they may require less training to reach high levels of performance, which may give the 527 
animals the best chance of answering the cognitive question posed by the experimenter. 528 
For investigating social learning in wild vervet monkeys, for example, the 529 
knowledge that dominant males and females are more likely to access resources before 530 
the rest of the troop helps in the design of experimental apparatus, whereby the 531 
dominant monkeys act as demonstrators to the rest of the troop (van de Waal, Renevey, 532 
Favre, & Bshary, 2010). In this way, researchers have found that the monkeys paid 533 
more attention to dominant females, who will spend their lives in their natal troop, than 534 
to males, who disperse to other groups upon maturity. The importance of phrasing a 535 
question in a meaningful way to the study animal can also be key to motivating animals 536 
in the wild to attempt the task. 537 





Role of Technology  540 
The enthusiasm for investigating cognition in the wild is being greatly benefitted 541 
by recent advances in technology, which are enabling access to many more species and 542 
questions that require animals to be followed over long distances, for long periods of 543 
time, or to be described in detail. Three types of technology, in particular, are 544 
transforming the collection of data in the wild: automatic experimental apparatus, 545 
biologgers, and computer vision.  546 
Passive integrated transponder (PIT) tags, for example, can be used to identify 547 
individuals interacting with experimental apparatus in the wild (Brewer, Redmond, 548 
Stafford, & Hatch, 2011; Morand-Ferron & Quinn, 2011). These tags are activated by 549 
an electromagnetic field that can be fitted to any number of objects (such as feeders, 550 
platforms, or nest boxes), allowing the experimenters to automatically log the identity 551 
and performance of an animal, including the duration spent by an individual at an 552 
apparatus. This automated approach allows the collection of high quality data from 553 
hundreds of animals, a feature rarely if ever possible in the laboratory. For example, 554 
90% of the great tit Parus major population in the Wytham Woods in the UK has been 555 
fitted with leg-ring PIT tags, making it possible to describe the social network of several 556 
sub-populations within that area and then to track the social transmission of the solution 557 
of novel tasks through a population (Aplin et al., 2015). 558 
Other technologies, on the other hand, allow researchers to record otherwise 559 
inaccessible behavior. Biologging technologies, such as accelerometers or geolocators, 560 
can be attached to an animal and will not only provide the location of the animal, but 561 
also give information on their rate of movement (Aguilar Soto et al., 2008), yield 562 
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environmental information such as light or temperature, whether the animal is in the 563 
water or not (Guilford et al., 2009), and can even include cameras, which allow access 564 
to the behavior of the animal in new ways (Bluff & Rutz, 2008; Rutz, Bluff, Weir, & 565 
Kacelnik, 2007). In particular, biologging technologies can enable data collection from 566 
species difficult to observe by any other means, such as marine animals and long 567 
distance migrants. In the context of investigating cognition in the wild, biologging 568 
technology has already been put to use in manipulations of animal navigation (e.g., 569 
Biro, Meade, & Guilford, 2004; Cochran, Mouritsen, & Wikelski, 2004), and it seems 570 
likely that these devices will become increasingly useful in the future. 571 
 Although less often used so far, computer vision also has significant potential for 572 
studying ‘wild’ cognition. Unlike PIT tagging and biologging, which involve attaching 573 
devices to animals, computer-vision technology allows researchers to track and record 574 
the behavior of animals without requiring the animal to carry any equipment. 575 
One application of this technology is the ability to track the movements and 576 
paths of animals in 3D, based on the view of multiple calibrated cameras. Although thus 577 
far the use of this technology in animal behavior research has mostly been restricted to 578 
the laboratory (but see Clark, 2009; Thierault et al., 2014; de Margerie et al., 2015), it 579 
has been used recently to track the flight paths of hummingbirds as they searched for a 580 
previously visited flower (Pritchard et al., 2016b, Figure 3). Although birds could be 581 
tracked only when they were in view of both cameras, the computer-vision technology 582 
applied to the data after collection meant that the experiments themselves did not 583 
require any expensive equipment, but still allowed examination of navigation in the 584 
wild in ways that previously have been restricted to the laboratory. 585 
In addition to providing economical tracking solutions, similar methods can be 586 
used to reconstruct the visual information available to animals navigating in the wild. 587 
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Using multiple overlapping photographs of an area, for example, three-dimensional 588 
reconstruction techniques can be used to generate a three-dimensional model of natural 589 
environments, which alongside the reconstructed paths of an animal, allow researchers 590 
access to the “view from the cockpit” of animals travelling through their worlds (Stürzl, 591 
Grixa, Mair, Narendra, & Zeil, 2015). These data can be used alongside experiments 592 
and computational modelling to quantify and manipulate information available to 593 
animals in their natural environments in unprecedented ways. 594 
  595 
Conclusions 596 
The study of cognition in the wild, especially spatial navigation, seems likely to 597 
continue gathering momentum as technological advances increase our access to ever 598 
more species and their behaviors in the field. We are optimistic about the implications 599 
of such work. 600 
Studying animal cognition in the wild can help biologists and psychologists 601 
interested in the evolution of cognition to understand the role that cognitive mechanisms 602 
play in the natural lives of animals. As the cognitive abilities of more species are 603 
studied in the environment in which such processes evolved, the prospects of a truly 604 
comparative study of cognition look bright. Comparing species that are either closely or 605 
distantly related, in similar or different environments, as well as quantifying the fitness 606 
consequences of variations in cognition under natural conditions, will greatly enhance 607 
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Figure legends 923 
Figure 1. Results of a time-place learning experiment testing whether hummingbirds 924 
could learn to associate different rewarded locations with different times. A territorial 925 
hummingbird had the option of visiting any of four patches each containing six artificial 926 
flowers. The flowers in only one patch contained rewarded at any one time, each for one 927 
hour a day. In order to visit the correct patch at the correct time, hummingbirds could 928 
learn the time of day each patch was rewarded or the order in which patches were 929 
rewarded. The figure represents the percentage of first visits made to each patch over 930 
the five days by 8 birds (mean). Each panel shows the visits made to each of the patches 931 
over the four hours that the patches were placed in the hummingbird’s territory. The 932 
vertical dash lines indicate the times at which a patch became empty and the next patch 933 
contained reward.  The horizontal black bars represent the duration over which the 934 
flowers in that patch contained reward.  After (Tello-Ramos et al. 2015). 935 
 936 
Figure 2. An example of using transformations to test what information hummingbird 937 
use to estimate the distance of a goal from landmarks. During training (left), 938 
hummingbirds could remember the distance of the flower (+) to the landmarks (black 939 
circles), in terms of the absolute distance of the flower (dashed arrow) or the apparent 940 
size of the landmarks (grey). In the test (right), where the size and position of the 941 
landmarks is increased, these cues now indicate different locations. From Pritchard et al. 942 
(2016)a. 943 
 944 
Figure 3. A three-dimensional reconstruction of the flight path of a hummingbird, as he 945 
comes in to feed from an artificial flower (triangle). The x, y, and z axes represent the 946 
flower’s position in metres relative to one of the cameras.  947 
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